Strategic Comments

JIIA Strategic Comments (2024-04)
Germany and Conflict in the Middle East: A Focus on German-Israeli Relations

07-26-2024
Asako Takashima (Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs)
  • twitter
  • Facebook

Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses of significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

1. The German Government's Response to Conflict in the Middle East

"The security of Israel is a national policy (Staatsräson) for Germany," said German Chancellor Olaf Scholz shortly after the Hamas terrorist acts on October 7, denouncing Hamas and stressing solidarity with Israel. His quick response, given as the Israeli flag was being projected onto the Brandenburg Gate, was dramatic. The chancellor has since often repeated the word "Staatsräson" and defended Israel's right to self-defense.i

Internationally, there was also overwhelming criticism of the atrocities committed by Hamas when it suddenly kidnapped civilians from Israel but, after Israel began combat operations against Gaza, observers began pointing out that the attacks might be exceeding the proportionality permitted under international law. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries that had been seeking to establish diplomatic relations or strengthen ties with Israel in recent years have one after another hardened their attitudes, and Arab countries are once again condemning Israel and viewing it as an enemy.

While some countries within the EU have been increasingly disapproving of Israel, the German government has consistently taken a pro-Israel position. This trend holds true not only for the federal government but also for state governments. The state of Saxony-Anhalt, for example, has made recognition of Israel's right to self-defense a condition of citizenship since December 2023.ii Having consistently taken the position of defending the Israeli government, Germany has come under increasing criticism from the international community. iii

Regarding the German government's response and the tone of the debate in Germany, some commentators have pointed out that this is a "tradition" that has existed since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Underlying this "tradition" is the relationship with Israel established by Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic.iv Although Adenauer did not use the word "Staatsräson", he was keenly aware of how important the establishment of relations with Israel was for West Germany's return to the international community. The Luxembourg Pact of 1952 spearheaded by Adenauer, which promised German postwar compensation to Israel, is proof of this. In accordance with the pact, the West German government paid Israel the equivalent of 35 million Marks in compensation, and it is understood that the two countries have since consistently enjoyed good relations at the governmental level.

2. Historical Background

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel had to wait until 1965, however, and it was not until 1973 that a chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany made an official visit to Israel. While the Adenauer administration certainly opened the door to reconciliation with Israel, it would be premature to assume that this is the only reason for the continued good relations between the two countries. In fact, the Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) promoted in the 1960s by Willy Brandt, who later became chancellor, heightened Israel's cautiousness.v

On the other hand, it was also Brandt's Ostpolitik that helped allay Israel's fears: during a visit to Poland in 1970 as part of Ostpolitik, Brandt knelt before a monument to the Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw. Brandt's "apology" was intended to improve relations with Poland and, by extension, with the Soviet Union, and is often described as an example of a successful attempt to do so. While this gesture took place in front of the said monument, it is not hard to imagine that this stance also appeared favorable to Israel. In this sense, Ostpolitik also served as Nah-Ostpolitik (Middle East policy). Having performed this act of atonement toward the Jewish people, Brandt became the first West German chancellor to visit Israel, where he established a strong relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.vi

German-Israeli relations experienced several "bumps" in the road thereafter, and the Greens, who first entered German national politics in the 1983 Bundestag elections, engaged in heated intra-party debates throughout the 1980s over how to interpret Germany's relationship with Israel. The Greens, whose origins lie in the peace and anti-nuclear movements, inevitably became increasingly critical of Israel's settlement policy and de facto possession of nuclear weapons. The Israeli side has also been wary of the Green Party's participation in national politics and has criticized the Green Party for issuing pro-Palestinian messages through German embassies following a 1984 visit to Israel by a Green Party parliamentary delegation.vii

Another such delegation traveled to Israel in 1987 at the invitation of the Israelis and was subjected to strong criticism by certain Green Party members for expressing a pro-Israel message after the trip. The debate within the party, described as "too pro-Palestinian on the first visit and too pro-Israel on the second," can be seen as a struggle between the Fundamentalists (Fundi) and the Realists (Realo).viii The dispute between Fundi and Realo within the Green Party was over whether the party would become a "realist" party in charge of government, which would also make the Israel issue a focus. In the end, the gradual dominance of the realists throughout the 80s allowed the Greens to rise to power in the 90s.

3. Public Sentiment

This overview of the past means that there has been some pro-Palestinian discourse in Germany. In fact, nearly 70% of respondents in a recent poll said that Israel's actions were unjustified.ix The strongly pro-Israeli statements of opinion issued by the ruling parties and by the chancellor as described above may stem from different reasons.

Since the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7 last year, anti-Semitic incidents have been on the rise in Germany. According to an organization that investigates anti-Semitic crimes, a total of 994 anti-Semitic crimes occurred between October 7 and November 9, 2023, an average of 29 per day.x This represents a 320% increase from the average number of crimes in 2022. Even before the October 7 incident, there had been reports of an increase in the number of anti-Semitic crimes in recent years.xi The far-right party AfD (Alternative for Germany) links these developments to the growing Arab population in Germany. Contrary to their claims, however, anti-Semitic discourse in Germany existed before the increase in the Arab population.xii The number of Arabs in Germany began to increase around 1995 and has further increased since 2015.xiii While anti-Semitic crimes did indeed increase slightly from around 2016, the definitive rise came in 2021, and experts point instead to a link with other social discourses, such as the COVID pandemic and anti-vaccine movements.xiv

In January 2024, it was discovered that a meeting last November led by AfD party members had discussed the need to "remigrate" people with non-German roots, again sparking strong criticism of the AfD and numerous demonstrations across the country.xv This meeting had been held at a guesthouse in the suburbs of Potsdam, not far from Berlin and, coincidentally, not far from the site of the 1942 Wannsee Conference, where the political decision to exterminate the Jews was made. So it was understandable that Nancy Faeser, Minister of Interior and community told said that this scandal reminded her of Wannsee Conference and criticized the AfD.xvi In May, Maximilian Krah, who was running as the leading candidate in the EU parliamentary elections, said that not all members of the SS were criminals, again causing a major scandal at home and abroad.xvii The emergence of a renewed xenophobic discourse in the country can help us understand why the regime is still paying close attention to anti-Semitic discourse.

4. Conclusion: Past and Future

It is true that the Federal Republic of Germany has been attentive to its bilateral relations with Israel since its founding. It was, as Adenauer expressed it, a necessary response for Germany to get back on its feet in the international community. Even during periods when leftist movements have become more active in society, the ruling party has always emphasized the special relationship with Israel and, reflecting on the past, has been determined in its efforts to make the relationship between the two countries a good one. A nation acknowledging the sins of the past is never viewed favorably by its own people. Even Brandt's kneeling in Warsaw as an apology for "crimes against humanity" was opposed by many in West Germany at the time. In a survey conducted by Der Spiegel magazine at the time, a whopping 48% of respondents judged Brandt's apology "excessive".xviii Nevertheless, by continuing to express its intention to apologize, the German government has demonstrated its willingness to improve relations with Israel, thereby ensuring the presence of the Federal Republic of Germany in the international community. Analyzing emotions in international politics, Todd Hall, a professor at Oxford University, argues that public rhetoric always precedes social rhetoric in politics.xix Germany's reflection on its past and its improved relations with Israel have not come about at the behest of society but under political leadership.

The inhumanity of the October 7 incident is indisputable. Some of the hostages were Germans and people of German descent, and the detailed coverage of these hostages stirred up many public emotions. The German government is correct that Israel has the right under international law to defend itself. On the other hand, it is also true that the current Israeli aggression against Gaza raises questions about its legitimacy in terms of international law. These two debates should be kept separate and not conflated. "Just" criticism in the international community must be fully recognized as distinct from "unjust" criticism, and "unjust" criticism of Israel within Germany will make it difficult to engage in "just" criticism. The "unjust" criticism here refers to the anti-Semitic discourse that persists in German society as well as the growing xenophobic discourse. From this perspective, the existence of anti-Semitism and xenophobia may be having an undesirable impact on those who condemn the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and Israel's excesses. Hence, the biggest enemy within Germany is the discourse of anti-Semitism, which needs to be properly isolated and discussed. Germany's ability to assert its legitimate position internationally depends on it, and a close eye must be kept on the course of the debate.

(This is an English translation of a Japanese paper originally published on June 11, 2024)




iii Also in academic circles, lectures by prominent figures critical of Israel were cancelled one after another at the request of the organizers. In particular, the refusal by the University of Cologne to extend a visiting professorship to American philosopher Nancy Fraser because of her participation in a petition drive to help the Palestinian people caused quite a stir in the academic community. https://jacobin.com/2024/04/nancy-fraser-germany-palestine-letter

v Brandt's policy toward the East was perceived as a diplomatic departure from Adenauer's previous emphasis on the West. Leftist movements have been gaining momentum in Germany since 1960, and these changes have raised concerns within the Israeli government that Germany might be moving too close toward the "East". See, Asako Takashima, "The Narrative of Apology: Japan and Germany after World War II," International Politics, No. 187, pp. 114-130, March 2017.

vii Archiv Grünes Gedächnis, B. II. 1, Nr 4110. Palestine-Konflikte, 1987-88, 18-3

viii Same as above

xii Anti-Semitic arguments also existed during the Cold War. Anti-Semitism by leftist groups in the 1970s developed into terrorist incidents. See Takashima (2017), above.

xiii The number of Arabs is believed to have increased further as many refugees chose Germany as their destination during the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015. https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/72321/umfrage/entwicklung-der-anzahl-der-muslime-in-deutschland-seit-1945/

xiv Conspiracy theories linking the Jewish people to the cause of the COVID epidemic and other crises have been pointed out. https://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/immer-mehr-antisemitische-straftaten.html 

xvii For his comments, Krah resigned from his position at the AfD; he was ordered to withdraw from the EU parliamentary election campaign, and the AfD was expelled from the EU parliamentary faction Identity and Democracy (ID). https://www.ft.com/content/adb37d25-f133-4c46-993d-e9c2dcecf3a7

xviii Thomas U. Berger, (2012) War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II. Cambridge University Press, p.63.

xix Hall, Todd H. (2015). Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage. New York: Cornell University.