Research Group on 'Russia in an Era of Great Power Competition' FY2021 － #3
"Research Reports" are compiled by participants in research groups set up at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and are designed to disseminate, in a timely fashion, the content of presentations made at research group meetings or analyses of current affairs. The "Research Reports" represent their authors' views. In addition to these "Research Reports", individual research groups will publish "Research Bulletins" covering the full range of the group's research themes.
Introduction
On July 2, 2021, President Vladimir V. Putin approved a new National Security Strategy. The new National Security Strategy reiterated Russia's stance of confrontation with the United States and European countries, with which relations had already deteriorated due to the crisis in Ukraine. It emphasized the importance of military power and economic and information security to protect national interests, and clarified the government's policy of defending Russia's traditional values and patriotism from external influences1. With the July 2020 revisions to the Constitution resetting the presidential term of office and securing the possibility of Putin's reelection, Russia's national strategy of maintaining internal order based on its own values and confronting Western countries is expected to continue until 2036. In the midst of the deterioration of external relations and a long-term government, what changes have occurred in the role of the Russian military and in the relationships between politics and the military and between society and the military?
Dealing with external threats is the primary mission of the military. After a series of military operations, including the war with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the Ukraine crisis, and the airstrikes in Syria, the military functions of the Russian armed forces - attack, defense, deterrence, coercion, etc. - have been significantly strengthened2. However, the functions and roles of the armed forces vary depending on the political, social and cultural context surrounding them, as well as their historical background, and are not limited to traditional military functions. This paper focuses on the political functions of the military in maintaining Russia's national strategy and the current administration3. When discussing the political functions of the military, it is generally assumed that there is a clear division and confrontation between the political leadership and the military, and this topic tends to be addressed as an issue of how to avoid political intervention by the military. However, the role of the military in the political process in Russia today is quite different from the ideal types presented by the theory of civil-ilitary relations.
The following sections present a perspective for analyzing the crisis and survival of authoritarian regimes in Russia and, through analysis of the tripartite relations among politics, the military, and society, points out that the military has the function of forming a "supermajority" to maintain the current administration4.
Perspective for analysis
(1)"Crisis of effectiveness" and "crisis of aging"
Authoritarian regimes justify the maintenance of power and the suppression of dissidents by manipulating ideologies and various governing principles on the one hand and promising to achieve goals such as economic growth and security on the other. From this, we can envision two factors that make it difficult to maintain the authoritarian system: the "crisis of effectiveness" and the "crisis of aging"5.
A crisis of effectiveness occurs when the achievement of a promised goal fails due to a decline in performance such as economic stagnation or deterioration in public security, and the decline in the ability of a government to govern becomes a problem. Under a democratic system, the problem can be solved by a change of government through elections. On the other hand, a crisis of aging arises when the goals set at the establishment of the regime have been achieved or when the validity of justifying doctrines such as communism or nationalism weakens over time6.
A crisis of effectiveness means a decline in the ability of the ruling elite to solve problems, and undermines the organizational interests of the military and the bureaucracy, which are the entities responsible for implementing policies. Therefore, the suppression of dissidents alone will not improve the situation, and it is relatively likely to lead to a loss of legitimacy of the government and the system. On the other hand, as long as the crisis of effectiveness does not intensify at the same time, it is possible to overcome the aging crisis to some extent by strengthening the rationale and raising the approval rating of the administration7. In other words, electoral authoritarianism can maintain stability as long as foreign military action and national prestige are used to form a "supermajority" to survive the election8.
The crisis facing Russian political leaders today is basically a crisis of aging. Of course, the Russian Federation as we know it today is a young state, having come into existence only 30 years ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Putin has been in power for 20 of those 30 years. Initially, his presidency was limited by the Constitution to two consecutive terms totaling eight years. Then, four years as prime minister were followed by a constitutional amendment which prolonged the term of the president to 6 years, allowing him to stay in office till 2024. The amendment of the Consistution in 2020 paved the way for further assumption of office thereafter. These years seem far too long for a single leader to remain in power. On the other hand, while there is no clear prospect that the economy will break out of the doldrums and, the response to the coronavirus pandemic has been inadequate, these issues have not surfaced in a way that would shake the survival of the regime. There is a crisis of effectiveness, but it remains at a latent level.
(2) Leviathan as a crisis avoidance mechanism
Russia is a Leviathan that is waging war in all directions after the annexation of Crimea, points out Professor Sergei A. Medvedev of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow9. Russia has become a Leviathan fighting the war for the space, the war for symbols, the war for memory, and the war for the current political regime all at once. In other words, Russia is not fighting only the "war for the space" that is being waged by the actual use of force in Ukraine and elsewhere to stop the loss of its sphere of influence. It is also engaged in the "war for symbols" to defend Russia's status as a nuclear power and its sovereignty as an aggregation of its own values and norms; the "war for memory" to promote national unity based on the historical perception of victory and liberation in the Great Patriotic War and oppose "revisions" to this historical perception; and the "war for the body" to maintain the current regime through national unity via patriotic education, suppression of protests by dissidents, and regulation of the Internet.
The pilots of Leviathan are the political leadership led by President Putin, and the Russian armed forces and other armed groups play an important role in waging their respective wars. It is not only the war for the space in which the Russian military plays an important role. Progress in improving strategic nuclear forces and maintaining combat readiness, as well as maintaining alert and surveillance capabilities by naval vessels, aircraft, etc., mainly in the vicinity of national borders, are part of the "war for symbols," and they also play a role in demonstrating strength in diplomacy. Domestic and foreign policies concerning the memory of the Great Patriotic War, and the political use of history is a powerful lever that enables the creation of the Russian state's identity across generations and mobilizes support for the regime. This is why Russia is strongly opposed to the words and actions of countries that deny the role of the Soviet Union in winning the war and claim that they were "occupied" rather than "liberated", considering such moves as "distortion of the history"10. It is not even necessary to refer to the military parade on Victory Day to understand the importance of the symbolic function of the Russian militaryin the "war for memory.".
Political functions of the military
(1) Rising military approval ratings
According to data compiled by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (ВЦИОМ), approval ratings for the Russian military soared from 58.7% a year earlier to 77.0% in 2014, and since then have remained higher than the next highest ranking institution, the Russian Orthodox Church, exceeding 90% in 201711 (see figure at right). The rise in the military's approval rating after 2014 tracked the rise in the approval rating of President Putin following the annexation of Crimea. And while the president's approval rating leveled off in the 60%-69% range following the large-scale protests triggered by the increase in the pensionable age in 2018, that of the military has remained very high. .
The military's broad support in society stems not only from the fact that the intermittent use of force since 2014 has increased Russia's presence in the international community, which has been widely covered by the media, but also from the symbolic function of national identity that the military has performed12. In other words, by continuing to fight a " war for the space", a "war for memory" and a "war for symbols" simultaneously, it was possible to form a supermajority that involves the military and civil society, which led to creating a cycle of strengthening and sustaining the rationale of the regime.
(2) The military and society
From the outset, President Putin has pointed out the importance of patriotism and implemented various measures to cultivate patriotism in Russian society. The legitimacy of communism and Marxism-Leninism that had framed the nation and its people was eventually lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the pride and dignity of the nation were damaged. Under these circumstances, the most influential factors in the ideal to unify Russia patriotism and shared memory on the Great Patriotic War. In the Great Patriotic War, different nations fought together for their homeland and won victory. That is why, across generations and regardless of ethnic differences, the vast majority of the people are proud of their victory in the Great Patriotic War and recognize it as one of the greatest events in history. Patriotism is one of the few bonds of national unity that can be supported by the majority in the multiethnic country of Russia13.
In order to foster patriotism, a policy had been promoted to align history textbooks used in public education with a view of history centered on the Great Patriotic War. In addition, in June 2016, the Ministry of Defense launched "Yunarmiya," a national military patriotic social movement association targeting schoolchildren aged 8 to 18. Yunarumiya has branches all over Russia that provide its members with history and military history education to foster patriotism, sports, summer camps, encouragement to join the military, and pre-enlistment training. Since 2017, members of Yunarmiya have joined the military parade to mark Victory Day, and their marches have been broadcast nationwide on television. As of July 2021, the association had 850,000 members. Although Yunarmiya was originally a "voluntary" operation, leverage from the top has been strengthened, as seen in the fact that the Deputy Defense Minister has indicated a target of one million members by the end of this year14.
The amended Constitution that took effect in July 2020 not only ensured the possibility of Putin's continuation as president by resetting his term of office, but also included new references to the fostering of patriotism and a perception of history. Although not mentioned in the original bill before the State Duma, both were amended in the second reading of the constitutional amendment bill in the State Duma, together with the language emphasizing patriotic and conservative values such as historical unity, faith in God, remembrance of the defenders of the fatherland, protection of historical truth, child patriotism, civil consciousness, and respect for elders15.
As patriotism has been officialized and militarized, it has been pointed out that politicians and the public differ on their definitions of the word "patriotism"16. As patriotism has become an instrument of electoral authoritarianism, political will is put before citizen initiative17. Patriotism, as the general public sees it, is a simple attachment to their native land, and few people reject this. The majority of citizens, however, prioritize their day-to-day lives18. It is true that patriotism is valued and widely supported, but it does not necessarily mean that patriotism from the above, directly linking patriotism with the state and defense and imposing a spirit of sacrifice, is accepted as it is.
(3) The relationship between politics and the military
During his first and second terms of office (2000-2008), President Putin promoted the civilianization of leadership positions at the Ministry of Defense (the defense minister and a small portion of director-general-level positions). Although he did not completely overcome the institutional habitude of the independence of the General Staff that had existed since the Soviet era, he worked to unify the chain of command. It was not easy to establish a shared sense of threat, but efforts were made to resolve the worsening social security problems of military personnel and to restore confidence in the political leadership of the military19. What was important in relation to foreign policy was the war with Georgia in August 2008, which served as an opportunity for the government to optimize the allocation of resources to the military, and to start in earnest the renewal and modernization of military equipment that had been significantly delayed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The broader acceptance of the view that Russia's sovereignty and sphere of influence are being threatened by Western countries through color revolutions, missile defense and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also a significant factor.
An important measure was taken in July 2018 to promote the sharing of values and threat awareness among the government and military. President Putin signed an Executive Order establishing the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces (Главное Военно-Политическое Управление: ГВПУ) in the Ministry of Defense and appointed Colonel General Andrei V. Kartapolov, asDeputy Minister of Defense heading this organization 20. The specific duties of the Main Military-Political Directorate were not evident at first, but it gradually became clear that they include control not only of military educational institutions such as the Military Academy of the General Staff, but also of media such as the military television network (Zvezda) and newspaper (Krasnaya Zvezda) as well as the operation of Patriot Park and Yunarmiya. To carry out the duties of the Main Military-Political Directorate, all units will be staffed with sergeants who will provide political education, and each military district will have lieutenant general-level posts to supervise political education. It was also found that civilian specialists in military psychology had been given ranks and appointed as officers21.
Needless to say, experts raised the question of why the Main Military-Political Directorate was necessary even though Russia does not have a one-party system22. In response to the question of whether the Main Military-Political Directorate was a revival of monitoring system of the Soviet Communist Party , which had been dismantled in 1991, Deputy Defense Secretary Kartaporov replied: "The Russian military has been changed and reformed. Today it is the world's most powerful army. The strength of a military is determined not by the number of soldiers, aircraft and ships but by the morale of the soldiers. ...the Main Military-Political Directorate is for that purpose. Its mission is not to copy the Soviet era, but to clarify the nation's military policy to its members and to mobilize them to carry out various tasks. The commander tells the soldiers how to shoot. And the Main Military-Political Directorate will tell them who to shoot and why"23.
He also said that preparing for information warfare is one of the key duties of the Main Military-Political Directorate: "Our mission is to build information resilience (информационный иммунитет) against different ideologies that try to influence and erode soldiers' perceptions . Our 'partners' see it as much cheaper to overthrow a country's regime than to fight it. We can see clearly how they do this. Today in the information space, there is a battle over social and individual perceptions. Young people in particular are targeted. Young people do not yet have their own opinions, and they are in the process of developing their character. Allowing 'partners' to infiltrate here would have undesirable consequences." 24 Blocking such 'infiltration' at the border is also a part of "national defense" aimed at protecting the society's traditional system of values, and the Main Military-Political Directorate is responsible for this function.
An article by President Putin entitled "Historical Unity between Russians and Ukrainians" published on July 12, 2021 has become a must-read in the military25. The existence of the Main Military-Political Directorate makes it easier to thoroughly propagate the self-righteous view that "Ukraine's real sovereignty is possible only in its partnership with Russia," a perspective totally irrelevant to Ukraine and the international community.
The Main Military-Political Directorate not only promotes the sharing of values and threat perceptions among the government and the military, but also expands the scope of its advocacy activities to younger members of civil society, and plays a role in the formation of a conservative political consciousness and the reproduction of a supermajority. In other words, the military has become a powerful force in the "war for the body". At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that the national strategy of the Putin administration, which respects the military in terms of patriotism, history, and resource allocation, promotes the organizational interests of the military. Promotion of supermajority by the military was not unilaterally imposed by the political side, but was in fact willingly accepted by the military leadership. At the root of the innovations in tactics and fighting methods and the multiple uses of force since 2014 have been a mutually beneficial relationship and an "unusual unity" between politics and the military25.
Thus, the "politicization of the military" in Russia today is quite different from the involuntary politicization of the military in the 1990s, which occurred when the military was caught up in conflicts between political forces. The problem with the military-political relationship is that, even if civilian control is established and military obedience to civilian government is ensured and even if it is supported by the vast majority of society actively or passively, it does not always produce the best results.
Conclusion
While the mechanism for forming a supermajority described above helps to avoid the confusion and instability that a possible change of government in Russia might bring, it also captivates the political awareness of members of Russian society, including the elite, and reduces the range of foreign policy choices. Russia's relations with the West have become irreparably strained due to the way it has created favorable conditions for itself through military and non-military means by mobilizing military forces to solve political problems without fully seeking diplomatic solutions26. Although dissidents in Russia have challenged the legitimacy of the current regime by exposing election irregularities and corruption, they have not opposed such a foreign policy. This is because they cannot increase their supporters by doing so.
Defense Minister Sergei K. Shoigu has been put on the top of the list in the September 17- - 19 legislative elections to bolster United Russia, which is experiencing a deepening slump in its approval rating. Deputy Defense Secretary Sergei Kartaporov, who has led Yunarmiya, will also run as a party candidate27. One focus of attention in this election will be the extent to which the "reliance on the military" that has been promoted directly or indirectly will bring about a "supermajority". Considering that the defense minister is a politician, not an active military officer, and that election campaigns by active and retired military officers are personal political activities that were conducted before, the principle that the military as an organization does not support any particular faction and is subject to the control of the elected government is being maintained, albeit barely. However, it would be difficult to deny the politicization of the military in Russia today.