Research Group on 'China and maritime interests/order' FY2025-# 1

"Research Reports" are compiled by participants in research groups set up at The Japan Institute of International Affairs, and are designed to disseminate, in a timely fashion, the content of presentations made at research group meetings or analyses of current affairs. "Research Reports" represent their authors' views.

At the end of January, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited China in the latest step in an unfolding thaw in the relationship between the two countries. The thaw had begun in October last year with the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the disengagement of troops from two points at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which represents the disputed boundary between the two countries. Tensions had started in 2020 when the Chinese simultaneously intruded across seven points on the LAC. According to New Delhi, the agreement in October dealt with the last two remaining points where troops were in a standoff and signified "a resolution of the issues that had arisen in 2020".¹

The October announcement was followed quickly by a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS leaders' summit at Kazan in Russia the same month. The two Special Representatives on the boundary issue - Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and CPC Politburo Member and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi - then met in December.

These agreements and meetings do not, however, signify that India-China relations are back to normal.

Tensions Ahead

The India-China boundary dispute dates to the late 1950s when India discovered the Chinese had built a road through its northwest state of Jammu and Kashmir to link Xinjiang and Tibet. Bilateral tensions increased further when in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet into what is today the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Tensions and clashes eventually flared into full scale conflict all across the India-China boundary in October 1962. By the end of the conflict a month later, the Indian region in the northwest known as Aksai Chin had passed fully into Chinese control. In the Indian northeast, however, Chinese troops would eventually withdraw despite having overrun Indian positions. Today, the dispute comprises these two areas, called the Western and Eastern Sectors by the Indians, alongside a smaller Central Sector.

Bilateral relations began to be normalized in the late 1970s with the return of ambassadors to the respective capitals and boundary negotiations started soon after with major agreements signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005. Subsequently, however, there has been little progress on the dispute even though the bilateral economic relationship has grown exponentially. Tensions on the boundary began increasing once again as both countries started building up infrastructure along the LAC and troops came into increasing contact with each other. The 2020 clashes were the deadliest since 1962 and have led to a breakdown of trust between the two sides, and especially between the two armies.

As to the latest thaw, it is worth noting that the Indian army chief was quoted in January during a media interaction that "a degree of standoff" continues despite the October agreement on disengagement.² For another, two remaining steps remain for a complete return to the status quo on the LAC as existed before April 2020 - something that the Indian side has insisted is a pre-requisite for the return of relations to normalcy. One is the de-escalation of troops - their withdrawal to previously decided locations away from the LAC sites of dispute. The other step is of de-induction, which requires both sides to permanently remove troops and equipment from the area as well as agree to limit their numbers in the extended vicinity.³ Chinese statements give no indication so far, that they are thinking of de-escalation, let alone, of de-induction.

There are now concerns on the Indian side about whether the temporary no-patrolling arrangement that was part of the disengagement process along some of the friction points of 2020 will turn permanent. In such case, it could be argued that the Chinese have succeeded in changing the status quo with their transgressions. Even as the first set of disengagement agreements were being concluded in 2022, the latter had taken to claiming that "the phase of emergency response since the Galwan Valley incident has basically come to an end, and the border situation is now switching to normalized management and control",⁴ suggesting they were happy simply preventing Indian troops from patrolling in areas where they had previously been doing so.

This being the state of affairs, de-escalation and de-induction are not going to be easy at all, as several observers have noted.⁵ What is more, even if the Chinese were to agree to the latter steps, they are likely to play hardball and expect the Indians to de-escalate and de-induct to the same degree as the Chinese side. However, infrastructure and terrain allow Chinese to induct troops much faster than the Indian side and can seriously constrain Indian responses as the case of Chinese transgressions in 2020 showed.

The continuance of the no-patrolling zones - termed 'buffer zones' in the Indian press and perceived as being on the Indian side of the LAC - are likely to be a source of continuing tensions in the relationship between the two armies. The breakdown of trust and confidence-building measures engendered by the Chinese transgressions will mean that the Indian side will insist on de-escalation and de-induction that respects the principle of "mutual and equal security" as enshrined in bilateral agreements.⁶ But if the Chinese record is anything to go by, they will not agree to this - seeking to maintain Chinese military advantages over India along the LAC.

It is also important to note that despite the latest disengagement agreement, this will be a fifth consecutive winter that troops of the two sides will spend in harsh weather at high altitude. Given this situation, it will not be surprising if tempers run short and clashes break out simply because of the difficulties of life and activity in such extreme conditions for human beings.

Meanwhile, from Beijing's point of view, all deals with India are likely to be seen as tactical compromises. China is unlikely to implement these in full given its views of India. The Chinese Party-state is unable to ascribe agency to India and given its existential competition with the United States and democracies in general, it also views New Delhi as acting at the behest of the US. There is also the desire to strengthen its political legitimacy and military strength in Tibet as the Dalai Lama nears the end of his days and compromises with India on the boundary dispute will be viewed as undermining Beijing's projection of itself as the best defender of Tibet's interests rather than the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile, or India.

In fact, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Chinese are either unwilling to go any further in terms of ensuring peace and tranquillity on the LAC or that they will raise forbiddingly high demands for any further compromises. Indeed, a case could be made that China is becoming more frank in saying or signalling what it thinks about the India-China relationship - or more specifically, what it will expect India to do to move the relationship forward.

For instance during the meeting between Misri and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang in January in Beijing, the Chinese were practically warning India by saying, "The two sides should seize the opportunity to move toward each other, explore more substantive initiatives, commit themselves to mutual understanding, mutual support and mutual achievement, rather than mutual suspicion, alienation and wearing each other out (emphasis mine)."⁷ The Chinese readout on the meeting between Misri and his counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong had a similar tone. China emphasized that

"the two sides should act in the fundamental interests of China and India and the two peoples, insist on viewing and handling China-India relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, adopt a frank and constructive attitude, actively promote dialogue and exchanges as well as practical cooperation, positively guide public opinion and popular will, increase trust and clear up suspicions, resolve disagreements, and push forward the development of China-India relations along a healthy and stable track" (emphasis mine). ⁸

Taken together, one could even argue that it was something of a mild scolding by the Chinese. The repeated use of the word "mutual" does not in any way suggest that the Chinese were admitting that the problem is on both sides, only that it is on the Indian side. The implication is that China somehow needs to remind the Indian side to take into account the interests of their own people and that the Indians are lacking in both the ability to view relations "from a strategic and long-term perspective (cong zhanlüe gaodu he changyuan jiadu kandai)" and in a "constructive attitude" (jianshexing taidu).⁹ The Chinese statement on the Misri-Sun meeting is perhaps, a little more direct in the call "to increase trust and clear up suspicions, and appropriately deal with disagreements" (zeng xin shiyi, tuo chu fenqi) again in no way implying that China had any responsibility for the present state of affairs and, therefore, needed to contribute to the exercise.

The call to "positively guide public opinion and popular will (zhengmian yindao yulun he minyi)" is a frequent refrain of Chinese think-tank researchers and scholars that is now finding expression in official statements. It implies quite simply that the Indian government should control and limit negative sentiment against China, including critical commentary in the Indian media.

At the same time, there are repeated attempts to place India and China in a frame different from that of the US and the West. The Chinese seem to think that there is some resonance to this argument in India or that there will be alignment in the wake of the Trump administration's global policies. For instance, Wang notes, that

"The improvement and development of China-India relations is fully in line with the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples, is conducive to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the countries of the Global South, and will help to make the contribution of the two ancient civilizations to peace, stability and development and prosperity in Asia and the world".¹⁰

However, there is enough evidence to show that China not only is engaged in outreach to the Global South on its own terms but that it also seeks leadership of the bloc at India's expense. The G20 summit that India hosted in September 2023 is a case in point. By this time tensions on the LAC were beginning to reduce and Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping had met on the sidelines of other international meetings. However, not only did Xi not attend the event even though the Indian Prime Minister had attended the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 2016, the Chinese delegation also opposed the insertion of Indian phrases into the final G20 documents.¹¹ Similarly, while the fact that India and China are ancient civilizations is indisputable, a close reading of Chinese statements over time indicates a hierarchical ordering in which China is the superior ancient civilization and India, the inferior one.¹²

Conclusion

At the meeting of the two Special Representatives, the Indian side tried gamely to keep the focus on boundary dispute stating that the two sides were "seeking a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for settlement of the boundary question, and resolved to inject more vitality into this process."¹³ The reference was to Article X of the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question under which the two sides were supposed to "continue their consultations in an earnest manner with the objective of arriving at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement"¹⁴ - or in other words, the business of what to give and take or what concessions the two sides would need to offer each other.

However, Chinese actions on the LAC over the past decade and more and the pressure these have created, have steered India more towards immediate efforts to relieve such pressure than allow it to keep the focus on the larger issue of the resolution of the boundary dispute. Besides the extended military deployment along the LAC and, no doubt, the associated expenses of this deployment, additional pressures for the Indian side now include a need to revive the Indian economy requiring at least some infusion of Chinese capital and technology at a time of uncertainties arising also from the Trump presidency in the US.

This Indian experience with China shows how a combination of Chinese military and diplomatic pressure on the one side and regional and global conditions on the other make the tasks of those willing to stand up to and respond to Chinese aggression very difficult.

While prospects of all-out conflict remain low, tensions will continue all along the LAC and are likely to escalate periodically into physical clashes. The latest agreements on disengagement should not be misinterpreted as a return to normalcy along the disputed boundary. Status quo ante April 2020 as the Indian side has insisted on has not been restored and the management of tensions between the two sides will become increasingly difficult.

Jabin T. Jacob is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies and Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi National Capital Region, India. He can be contacted at jabin.jacob@snu.edu.in

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